The analysis focuses on the stock price impact of firms' U.S. cross-listing on home-market rival firms. A theoretical model is presented that indicates the effect is ambiguous, and that it depends on whether there is a decrease in the cost of capital for rival firms and on the improved growth opportunities of the listing firm that make rivals have relatively lower growth prospects. The empirical work uses both listing dates and announcement dates of forthcoming ADR programs. An event study approach is employed to analyze the impact on the home market price of the rival firm around the dates of listing and announcement of listing. We find negative cumulative average abnormal returns for the rival firms around the announcement and listing dates, consistent with rival firms being hurt by the listing. The evidence suggests that investors see rivals as less transparent, less informative, and with poorer growth prospects relative to the listing firm. We also find evidence that the effect on the rival firm is stronger for firms from emerging market countries than for firms from developed market countries.
I. Introduction
This paper studies the impact of firms' cross-listing in the United States on home-market rival firms. One reason why firms may wish to list in the U.S. is to send a signal to investors about their good quality and their commitment to increased disclosure, and thus to be able to exploit better future growth opportunities. This signal could impact not only the listing firm, but it could also affect firms in the same industry and country as the listing firm, as investors revise their expectations about firm values.
The empirical evidence indicates that a firm listing its shares in the United States experiences a positive change in its share price at home. Yet positive or negative spillover effects may be experienced by its primary home-market rival which is not listed in the U.S. A positive spillover effect could be generated if the U.S. listing provides a positive signal for both the listing firm and its primary home-market rivals. This could involve a market integration effect where home market firms are now priced in a global context rather than in a segmented market. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Errunza and Miller (2000) find a strong negative impact of cross-listings on the cost of capital. Eaton, Nofsinger and Weaver (2003) show how the cost of capital falls for cross listing firms, and that the size of the fall is related to the disclosure quality of the home country. If there is also a fall in the cost of capital for rival firms not cross-listed, then rivals may benefit from the cross-listing. However, it is also possible that rival firms may be harmed by a firm's U.S. listing. When a firm lists in the U.S. and meets the more stringent disclosure requirements of U.S. regulations, firms might be better able to exploit growth opportunities. If rivals are seen as firms with relatively lower growth opportunities with respect to the listing firm, then this creates a negative impact on the rival.
Most foreign companies are traded in the U.S. as American Depositary Receipts.
An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a negotiable certificate denominated in U.S.
dollars that represents the ownership of shares in a non-U.S. company. ADRs may trade on organized exchanges or over-the-counter (OTC) and can be either capital raising or not. There are four types of ADRs. Level I ADRs trade over-the-counter and require no reconciliation to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and so involve minimal disclosure under U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations.
Level II ADRs are for firms that list on a U.S. exchange but raise no new capital. Level III ADRs are for firms that want to raise capital and be listed on a U.S. exchange. Level II and Level III ADRs require U.S. GAAP reconciliation and full disclosure as with any U.S. firm. Finally, Rule 144A ADRs are for firms that seek private U.S. placements to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). They do not require GAAP reconciliation or full SEC disclosure.
Listing in the U.S. may offer several advantages. Firms might list in the U.S. for the following reasons: to enlarge their shareholder base; as a means of advertising aimed at enhancing their visibility and image for the company's products; to raise capital; to be in a liquid secondary market; to use the ADR in a takeover of a U.S. firm, or to signal their good quality to investors by submitting themselves to increased disclosure through compliance with U.S. SEC regulations, and "bonding" with the U.S. market, allowing them to better take advantage of growth opportunities.
Theoretical models by Fuerst (1998) , Moel (1999) , Cantale (1998) and Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier (1999) predict that firms will disclose more information at the time of listing as a means of signaling their high quality. Empirically, there are numerous papers that study the effect of firms that cross-list. A survey of the effects of listing shares abroad is conducted by Karolyi (1998) . Overall, evidence indicates that companies experience an increase in home-market value in the month around the listing. This is consistent with the hypothesis that good quality firms list in the U.S. as a signaling mechanism. Miller (1999) shows that when a foreign firm decides to list in the U.S. it benefits in terms of abnormal returns around the announcement of the listing. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2002) analyze the difference in firm values for foreign firms that list in the U.S. and those that do not. They find that the value of firms that list in the U.S. is higher than the value of firms from the same country that do not list in the U.S. The valuation differential is found to be 16.5% on average.
Our focus is on the impact the U.S. listing has on rival firms' share values. There has been little work related to this issue. Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2002) match a sample of foreign firms that cross-list with one of firms that are not cross-listed, and compare their characteristics. They find that relative to non-cross-listed firms, cross-listed firms tend to have stronger earnings performance, are valued more highly by the market, and smooth their local-GAAP earnings less aggressively than non-cross-listed firms so that the resulting accounting data are more highly correlated with share price and stock returns. These results are also consistent with the idea that it is good quality firms that cross list, and that disclosure requirements help in the process of screening for good quality firms.
A particularly relevant paper is Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) . They analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the welfare implications of disclosure regulation. Additional related papers from the accounting literature include Foster (1981) and Freeman and Tse (1992) who document that the disclosures of one firm can affect share prices of others. In the empirical finance literature, Hertzel (1991) did not study disclosure but estimated the impact of stock repurchases on rival firms' stock prices and found that stock repurchase effects are basically firm-specific with no significant effects on rivals.
After the first draft of our paper was written, we learned of another study that addresses related issues. Lee (2002) explores the source of the positive price impact for listing firms. As part of his analysis, he examines portfolios of rival firms associated with firms that have listed in the United States and finds that rival firms, as a group, tend to have negative abnormal returns. He concludes that a U.S. listing has a positive stock price impact for the listing firm because of the enhanced ability of U.S.-listed firms to take advantage of growth opportunities. Our analysis is different from his in that we analyze the impact on the primary rival of the listing firm. We do not use indexes of industry rivals since firms in the same industry might be very different in size and trading frequency, further, the effects of firms being viewed as less transparent with respect to the listing firm should apply for similar firms in the industry. Further, we look only at first listings from each industry, in an attempt to capture any potential industry liberalization effects, and we consider both emerging and developed markets. Fernandes (2003) also looks at the impact of cross listings on home market firms. In trying to examine liberalization events, he analyzes the impact on home market firms of the first ADR to be created from the country, by using a sample of emerging market ADRs and monthly data. He finds a positive effect on home-market firms when the first ADR is created. Another paper that looks at the effects of cross-listings on rival firms is that by Bradford and Martin (2002) . They analyze the impact of cross-listings on both U.S. rivals and domestic-market rivals, by looking at listing dates. Instead of focusing on a matched rival, they create portfolios of all rival firms in the industry for which data are available, and find a positive impact on U.S. rival firms. Using monthly prices, they do not find an effect on home market rival firms.
The model developed in Section II depicts 2 firms located outside of the United States. Firm i lists its shares on a U.S. exchange and firm j does not. We want to analyze the impact of firm i's listing on firm j. More specifically, we seek to analyze the impact of i's listing on the share price of j in the home country. In our model, there is a controlling shareholder who controls the management of the firm and who can expropriate cash flows from minority shareholders. If the firm lists in the U.S., this reduces the level of optimal expropriation of cash flows by the controlling shareholder, but the firm is better able to exploit growth opportunities and its cost of capital falls. All of these effects work in the same direction: an increase in the price of the cross-listed firm. The effects of this cross listing on the rival firm are twofold. First, there is a positive effect on the rival firm if its cost of capital falls. Second, there is a negative effect on the rival since the market assigns a lower probability to it having good growth prospects after the cross listing. The two effects work in opposite directions and hence the effect of the cross-listing on the rival firm depends on which effect dominates. The effect of cross listings on rival firms is therefore more of an empirical question. Section III will discuss the data and methodology used for empirically testing the rival firm effect of cross-listing. Then in Section IV, the empirical results are presented.
Our findings suggest that rival firms are hurt by the listing of other firms in their industry.
Over a 5 day window surrounding the listing date, rival firms experience a -3.05% mean cumulative abnormal return, which is significant at the 1% level. Additionally, we find that the effect on the rival is stronger for firms from emerging markets than for those from developed countries. The mean cumulative abnormal returns are -5.00% and -2.23%, respectively. Finally, Section V offers a summary and conclusion.
II. Cross-Listing Effects on Rival Firms: Theory
We start by assuming we have a firm (firm i) with a controlling shareholder who In particular, assume that the marginal cost of expropriation is positive and increasing , that stronger minority shareholder protection makes expropriation more costly to the manager , and that the marginal cost of expropriation increases with better investor protection . Under these conditions, the total cash flow to the manager of firm i is: 
The manager chooses the optimal amount of the firm's cash flows to expropriate by maximizing his own cash flow. If is the optimal amount of expropriation by the manager of firm i, then it must satisfy the first order condition: 
This result is similar to that in La Porta et al. (2002) . 3 The bonding hypothesis was first posited by Coffee (1999 Coffee ( , 2002 and suggests that by cross-listing on the NYSE or Nasdaq firms commit to higher disclosure and to respect minority shareholders' rights, since the listing requires the firm to reconcile its financial statements to the U.S. GAAP, to comply with the U.S. SEC, and to meet the requirements of the exchange on which it lists. 4 Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2002) argue that the positive effect of creating ADR programs comes from the enhanced ability to take advantage of growth opportunities.
By substituting the optimal amount of expropriation before the cross-listing into (1) we can derive the cash flow to the insider before the cross listing:
The manager of the firm will only cross-list if the benefits from the enhanced growth opportunities from the cross-listing offset the costs associated with a smaller expropriation of cash flows. In other words, a cross-listing will occur for firm i if . Therefore, firms that cross-list are those for which:
Suppose there are only two types of firms, those with good growth prospects G and those with bad growth prospects G Before any listings the price of firm i will be:
If firm i cross-lists then three things will happen. First, the firm will reveal its type G + .
Second, the cross listing will reduce the cost of capital for the firm since its risk will be shared by a larger investor base. As the cost of capital falls, the discounted expected future cash flows will change from to , where . Third, the controlling shareholder will expropriate less cash flow from the firm. He will now expropriate
. By all of these effects the price of firm i (the listing firm) will increase to:
Consider now another firm in this industry, firm j. Before the cross-listing by firm i, the price of firm j is: 
π as the probability of cross-listing by firms in this industry. Since C be the discounted expected future cash flows for firm j after the cross-listing by firm i, then
The price of firm j after the cross-listing by firm i will be:
Stulz (1999) industry event, the impact on the price of the rival firm depends on whether the effect of the lower cost of capital is stronger than the effect of the rivals being seen as lower quality firms relative to the listing firm. If the effect of reduced growth prospects is stronger than the liberalization effect then the price of the rival firm should fall. If, on the other hand, the liberalization effect is stronger, then we should observe a positive impact on rival firms. Further, if an ADR is a firm-specific liberalization event, then we should observe that the listing hurts rival firms.
III. Data and Methodology
We constructed our sample in the following way. Table I reports the names of the listed firms and their rival firms, the date that the news of the ADR plans first appears, the date of listing, and the home country.
We use an event study approach to measure the impact of a firm's listing on the rival firm. We measure the abnormal returns for the rival around the date that the listing firm listed in the U.S. The methodology for measuring abnormal returns is the following.
Let's call firm A the firm that listed in the U.S. and firm B the rival firm, which is not listed in the U.S. Then, normal returns for the rival (firm B) are calculated for a period before firm A lists in the U.S. If we let day 0 be the day that firm A lists in the U.S. then we calculate normal returns using days -180 to -31 (150 days prior to the event window).
To measure normal returns, the market model is applied. The market model assumes that there exists a linear relationship between market return and the security return. We estimate the normal return using the 150 days prior to the event window. The equation estimated is:
where ( 
where T is the number of observations used in the estimation of normal returns. An estimate of the variance of the residuals during the event window is: 
Under the null hypothesis, the standardized abnormal return follows a student t distribution with (T-2) degrees of freedom. In order to make inferences about a firm over a period of time, we can use the standardized cumulative abnormal returns. The standardized cumulative abnormal return between day T 1 and T 2 (a total length of L= T 2 -
which has a student t distribution with (T-2) degrees of freedom.
The mean abnormal return is the sample mean taken over all firms, if we let N be the number of firms in the sample, then it is computed as:
where t is defined in trading days in relation to the event date, which is denoted as day 0.
A Z-test for the significance of the day t mean abnormal return is given by:
This test statistic can be used to test the null hypothesis that the expected value of the standardized abnormal returns is equal to zero against the alternative that the expected value of the standardized abnormal returns is not equal to zero. Under the null hypothesis, t Z follows the standard normal distribution.
The cumulative mean abnormal return between day T 1 and T 2 is: 
and a Z-test for its significance is given by:
This test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the cumulative mean abnormal returns are equal to zero, against the alternative that the cumulative mean abnormal returns are different from zero. Under the null hypothesis, L Z follows the standard normal distribution.
A precision-weighted cumulative mean abnormal return is also computed as: 
. Finally, we report a Generalized Sign Z test. The test uses the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. The null hypothesis for this test is that the fraction of positive returns is the same as in the estimation period.
IV. Empirical Results

A. Impact on the rival firm around the listing date
Table II presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns for windows of days (-5, -1), (+1, +5) and (-5, +5), as well as the event date mean abnormal return (0, 0). The table also presents the number of firms that had positive and negative abnormal returns on that respective day, the Z statistic and the Generalized Sign Z. During a 5 day window surrounding the listing date, we find a negative and statistically significant -3.05%
abnormal return suggesting that rival firms are hurt by the listing. Notice also that the mean cumulative abnormal return is stronger for window (-5, -1) than for the (+1, +5)
window. This difference could be due to the fact that we are calculating abnormal returns around the listing date and not the (prior) announcement date when information is first received by the market. Identifying the announcement day when news of the listing is revealed is problematic and subject to great error so for now we center our estimation around the first day of listing.
Figure 1 presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the 5 days around the listing date. Note the sharp decline in cumulative returns before the listing date. These results suggest that around the listing date, the rival firms are hurt by the listing. In terms of our theoretical model, the positive effect due to industry liberalization is dominated by the negative effect due to lower transparency and hence relatively lower growth prospects.
Next, we turn to testing whether the abnormal returns for rival firms that come from emerging markets differ from those of firms that come from developed markets.
Miller (1999) studies the market reaction to ADR listings in the U.S. He uses an event study approach where the event is the announcement of a forthcoming listing in the U.S.
He finds positive abnormal returns around the announcement date without any subsequent post-listing dissipation of those returns and also finds that abnormal returns are largest for firms that list on major U.S. exchanges. In addition, Miller finds that firms from emerging markets have larger abnormal returns than those from developed markets.
Over a 3-day announcement window, he finds that foreign firms in emerging markets experienced nearly double the cumulative abnormal returns of firms from developed markets; however, the difference was not statistically significant. These findings suggest that firms that list on major U.S. exchanges where disclosure requirements are stricter, benefit more from listing than firms that choose other listing mechanisms. This could imply that good quality firms list on exchanges to signal their good quality to investors.
Having found in the previous literature a differential impact on listing firms from emerging and developed markets, we turn to answering the question of whether there is also a differential impact on rival firms of those firms listed, by looking at emerging and developed market rival firms. In order to analyze this, we subdivide the sample into 18 firms from emerging markets and 43 firms from developed markets. The results are shown in Table III 
B. Impact on the rival firm around the announcement date
We next study the impact on the rival firms of the announcement of a forthcoming U.S. listing. The results for the announcement dates should be taken with caution since identifying the announcement dates is subject to great error, and it may well be that the listing event is a more reliable date for analysis. Announcement dates were collected by looking at the first time there was an announcement of the forthcoming U.S. listing on both the Lexis-Nexis database and Dow-Jones Interactive. We were able to find announcement dates for 45 of the firms in our sample. Announcement dates are presented in the fourth column of Table I. Table IV presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the rival firms around the announcement date. The mean cumulative abnormal return around the (-5, 5) window is -1.86%. We find a negative impact on the rival firms when the firm announces a listing in the U.S. market, but the impact is not significantly different from zero. Table V presents the results of subdividing this sample into 28 firms from developed countries and 17 firms from emerging market countries. The mean cumulative abnormal returns for the (-5, 5) day window around the announcement day are 0.24% and -5.31% for the developed and emerging market rival firms, respectively.
The positive impact on the rival firms from developed markets is not significantly different from zero. In Figure 3 we can see the cumulative abnormal returns for a window of 5 days before to 5 days after the announcement of the forthcoming listing. There is a clear difference between the rival firms from developed markets and those from emerging markets.
C. Robustness Check
We have calculated the abnormal returns around the listing date for our sample of rival firms around an event window of (-30, 30) using as normal returns those in the estimation window (-211, -31) . It could be argued that our results are contaminated since the announcement date may fall inside our event or estimation window. If true, then this could make it harder to find significant results, so that the contamination would work against finding a significant listing effect. Therefore, the true impact on the rival firm may be stronger than reported. To explore this possibility, we conduct a robustness check.
The test was conducted as follows. First, for estimating normal returns we use the same estimation window as used for the calculation of the announcement effect, if the firm had an identifiable announcement. For firms with no identifiable announcement, we use the period (-211, -31) days prior to the listing. Since during these dates there was no announcement of the firm's intention to list, this should be a clean measure of the normal returns of the firm. Next, since there are some firms for which the announcement of a future U.S. listing fell during the listing event window, we eliminated those firms from this subsample. Then an event study around the listing date is performed to see whether there is an impact on the rival firm. The sample consisted of 37 rival firms, of which 27 are from developed market countries and 10 from emerging market countries. The results, presented in Table VI , strengthen our previous findings. The mean cumulative abnormal return around a (-5, 5) window is -3.99% for the rival firms in our sample, and is significant at the 1% level. Rival firms are hurt at the time of listing by the listing firm.
When the sample is subdivided into emerging and developed markets, we find that the cumulative abnormal return around the listing day for the (-5, 5) day window is -2.83%
for the developed markets sample, and -7.12% for the emerging markets sample. Rival firms from emerging markets are hurt more by the listing than those from developed markets.
D. Using both local and world returns for estimating normal returns
As a further robustness check, we calculated abnormal returns using the following market model to estimate normal returns: The results are qualitatively similar to our previous findings. Tables VII and VIII show the results for listing and announcement dates respectively. The cumulative average abnormal returns around the listing date for the (-5, 5) day window (where day 0 is the listing day) is -3.15% and significant at the 1% level. Rival firms are hurt when their counterparts list in the U.S. market. The mean cumulative abnormal returns for developed and emerging market firms around the same window are -2.92% and -3.68%
respectively. Again, we find that the impact on the rival firm is stronger for firms from emerging markets than for those of developed markets. The mean cumulative abnormal returns around the (-5, 5) day period surrounding the announcement day are -1.76% for the full sample, -0.07% for developed market firms and -4.54% for emerging market firms. The full sample results are significant at the 10% level while the emerging market results are significant at the 5% level. The earlier findings using only global indexes are robust to the addition of local return indexes: rival firms from emerging markets have a larger negative abnormal return than other firms.
V. Conclusion
This paper provides theory and evidence related to the stock price effects on rival firms when a firm cross-lists its stock in the U.S. We focus on the listing firm's major rival's stock price in the home market. The evidence indicates that when a firm crosslists in the U.S., its primary rival in the home market that is not listed in the U.S. is hurt by the listing. This is consistent with the idea that firms cross-list as a means of signaling to investors their good quality by committing to increased disclosure. In addition, rival firms from emerging markets are hurt more by the listing than rival firms from developed markets Theory suggests that the positive effect on rivals due to a decrease in the cost of capital for rival firms is offset by the negative effects that are associated with rival firms being viewed as relatively less transparent, less informative, and with lower relative growth prospects because of their decision not to list. The empirical evidence indicates that the effect of lower rival transparency and decreased growth prospects following the listing firm is the dominating effect. Rival firms tend to suffer when listing firms list their stock in the United States.
A public policy implication of these findings is that listing in the U.S. should be viewed as creating incentives for better disclosure and law enforcement in the home market. More transparent accounting and corporate governance standards, as well as stricter laws in the home market might serve as a partial substitute for a U.S. listing.
Table I. Listing Firms and Rivals
The first column of the table reports the firm that listed in the U.S. and the second column, the rival firm associated with it. In the third column the country of origin of the listing firm and the rival firm is shown. (-5, +5) , where day 0 represents listing day. The third column is the precision-weighted cumulative mean abnormal returns. The positive:negative column reflects how many firms had positive (and negative) cumulative abnormal returns in that respective window. The Z test statistic is a test of the significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return. The Generalized Sign Z is a test with the null hypothesis that the fraction of positive cumulative returns is the same as in the estimation period. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. (-5, -1) , (0, 0), (+1, +5) and (-5, +5) , where day 0 represents listing day. The third column is the precision-weighted cumulative mean abnormal returns. The positive:negative column reflects how many firms had positive (and negative) cumulative abnormal returns in that respective window. The Z test statistic is a test of the significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return. The Generalized Sign Z is a test with the null hypothesis that the fraction of positive cumulative returns is the same as in the estimation period. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. (-5, +5) , where day 0 represents the announcement day. The third column is the precision-weighted cumulative mean abnormal return. The positive:negative column reflects how many firms had positive (and negative) cumulative abnormal returns in that respective window. The Z test statistic is a test of the significance of the mean cumulative abnormal return. The Generalized Sign Z is a test with the null hypothesis that the fraction of positive cumulative returns is the same as in the estimation period. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. Abnormal returns are calculated for each of the 61 rival firms in our sample. The abnormal returns are based on a market model using Datastream International's World Index. The abnormal returns were then aggregated across firms and time. This figure presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the listing date (day 0) for a (-5, +5) day window. Abnormal returns are calculated for each of two sub-samples, the first consisting of 18 firms from emerging markets and the second of 43 firms from developed markets. The abnormal returns are based on a market model using Datastream International's World Index. The abnormal returns were then aggregated across firms and time. This figure presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the listing date (day 0) for a (-5, +5) day window.
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-5.00% Abnormal returns are calculated for each of the 45 rival firms in our sample. The abnormal returns are based on a market model using Datastream International's World Index. The abnormal returns were then aggregated across firms and time. This figure presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date (day 0) for a (-5, +5) day window for the 61 rival firms in our sample. It also shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of each of our two sub-samples, the first consisting of 17 firms from emerging market countries and the second consisting of 28 firms from developed market countries.
-5.00% Days relative to the announcement day
